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on cross-examination will usually not be allowed." 10 1
EE.

Meaning of Materiality

In State v. Kerns,10 2 Justice McHugh ruled that "[t]he evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
103
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A.

Defendant'sPresence atAll CriticalStages

Justice McHugh ruled in State ex rel. Redman v. Hedrick'04 that "[i]n a
criminal proceeding, the defendant's absence at a critical stage of such proceeding
is not reversible error where no possibility of prejudice to the defendant occurs."' 0 5
B.

Continuance

The case of State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey' 0 6 called upon the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent concerning continuances in
criminal cases. Justice McHugh noted that the court's precedent was inconsistent
with fairness, and in doing so, he held that "[syllabus points] 1 and 2 in State ex
rel. Holsteinv. Casey, 164 W. Va. 460, 265 S.E.2d 530 (1980) are hereby overruled
to the extent the same are in conflict with this opinion."' 10 7

The court in Hey then went on to establish new law in the area of
continuances in criminal cases. Justice McHugh held as an initial matter that
[t]he determination of what is good cause, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 62-3-1, for a continuance of a trial beyond the term of
indictment is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and when
good cause is determined a trial court may, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 62-3-1, grant a continuance of a trial beyond the term of
indictment at the request of either the prosecutor or defense, or

101

Id at Syl. PL 4.

102

420 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1992).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

103

105

408 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

106

294 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1981).

107

Id.at Syl. Pt. 5.

104

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

upon the court's own motion. 0 8
The Hey opinion next set fourth a bright line specifically for multi-judge
circuit courts to sua sponte continue a criminal case. Justice McHugh wrote that
"[a] trial judge in a multi-judge circuit may, upon his own motion and for good
cause, order a continuance of a trial beyond the term of indictment because of the
judge's congested trial docket, and such judge need not ascertain whether any other
judge in the circuit can try the case within the term of indictment."' 0 9
Justice McHugh concluded the opinion in Hey by establishing a rule of law
to assist trial courts when confronted with efforts by prosecutors to unjustifiably
delay criminal trials. The court held as follows:
Where the trial court is of the opinion that the state has
deliberately or oppressively sought to delay a trial beyond the
term of indictment and such delay has resulted in substantial
prejudice to the accused, the trial court may, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 62-3-1, finding that no good cause was shown to continue
the trial, dismiss the indictment with prejudice, and in so doing the
trial court should exercise extreme caution and should dismiss an
indictment pursuant to W.Va. Code, 62-3-1, only in furtherance of
the prompt administration of justice.1 0
C.

Arrest
The court held in State v. Boggess:1.
Where a conservation officer, employed by the West Virginia
Department of Natural Resources, arrested an individual for the
offense of possession of marihuana with the intent to deliver,
which offense was committed in the presence of the officer, that
arrest was authorized under the provisions of W. Va. Code, 20-7-4
[1971], which statute describes
the authority, powers and duties of
12
conservation officers.

108

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

109

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

110

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

ill

309 S.E.2d 118 (1983).

112

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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D.

Indictment and Information

State v. Wade113 clearly articulated that "[a]s a general rule, under W. Va.
R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1), the body, charge or accusation contained in an information is to
be judged by the same standards114that determine the sufficiency of the body, charge
or accusation of an indictment."

In State ex reL Starr v. Halbritter,115 Justice McHugh stated:
The failure of the grand jury as a body to vote upon the text of the
indictment is a fundamental error so compromising the integrity of
the grand jury proceedings as to constitute prejudice per se, and
the indictment must be dismissed as void, without prejudice
to the
1
right of the state subsequently to seek a valid indictment. 6
In State ex reL Redman v. Hedrick,'17 Justice McHugh held that "[w]here a
prosecutor in a criminal case becomes the presiding judge over the grand jury that
ultimately indicts the defendant in such case, the record of the grand jury
proceeding must be made a part of the record before this Court will determine
whether prejudice has resulted therefrom." 118
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of variance between proof and the
charge contained in an indictment in the case of State v. Johnson."9 The court held
that
[i]f the proof adduced at trial differs from the allegations in an
indictment, it must be determined whether the difference is a
variance or an actual or a constructive amendment to the
indictment. If the defendant is not misled in any sense, is not
subjected to any added burden of proof, and is not otherwise
prejudiced, then the difference between the proof adduced at trial
and the indictment is a variance which does not usurp the
traditional safeguards of the grand jury. However, if the defendant
is misled, is subjected to an added burden of proof, or is otherwise
prejudiced, the difference between the proof at trial and the
indictment is an actual or a constructive amendment of the

113

327 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1985).

114

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

115

395 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 1990).

116

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

117

408 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1991).

118

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

119

476 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1996).
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120
indictment which is reversible error.

E.

Joinderof Offenses

Justice McHugh held in State v. McFarland12 1 that "[i]f it appears that a
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment or
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election
or
1
separate trials of the counts or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
F.

PreliminaryHearing

Justice McHugh relied upon the decision in Spaulding v. Warden, West
Virginia State Penitentiary123 to address the issue of right to counsel at a

preliminary hearing in the case of State v. Stout.1 24 The court held:
A preliminary hearing, when accorded an accused by a
[magistrate] pursuant to [W. Va.] Code 1931, 62-1-8, as amended,
is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding to which the right to
counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, attaches, and a denial of counsel in those
circumstances constitutes error for which a defendant is entitled to
relief, unless it is clear beyond125a reasonable doubt that the denial
of counsel was harmless error.
Several crucial issues involving a preliminary hearing were addressed by
Justice McHugh in Desperv. State.126 The court held initially that
A preliminary examination conducted pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure serves to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it; the purpose of
such an examination is not to provide the defendant with
discovery of the nature of the State's case against the defendant,
although discovery may be a by-product of the preliminary

120

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

121

332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985).

122

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

123

212 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1975).

124

310 S.E.2d 695 (W. Va. 1983).

125

Id. at Syl.

126

318 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1984).
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examination."
Justice McHugh next stated:
In challenging probable cause at a preliminary examination
conducted pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a defendant has a right to cross-examine
witnesses for the State and to introduce evidence; the defendant is
not entitled during the preliminary examination to explore
testimony solely for discovery purposes. The magistrate at the
preliminary examination has discretion to limit such testimony to
the probable cause issue, and the magistrate may properly require
the defendant to explain the relevance128to probable cause of the
testimony the defendant seeks to elicit.
Disclosure of the identity of an informant during a preliminary hearing was
addressed by Justice McHugh in State v. Haught.129 The court held that
[d]uring a preliminary hearing held for the purpose of determining
the question of probable cause for an arrest or search, a trial court
is not required to disclose the identity of a confidential informant,
provided that there is a substantial basis for believing that the
informant is credible, that there is a factual basis for the
information furnished and that it would impose an unreasonable
burden on one of the parties or on a witness to require that the
identity of the informant be disclosed at the hearing. 30
Justice McHugh said in Peyatt v. Kopp 131 that
[t]he magistrate has the discretion to allow hearsay evidence at a
preliminary hearing under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 5.1 if three
conditions are met: (1) the source of the hearsay is credible; (2)
there is a factual basis for the information furnished; and (3) an
unreasonable burden would be imposed on one of the parties or on
a witness to require that
the primary source of the evidence be
1 32
produced at the hearing.

127

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

128

Id at Syl. Pt

129

371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).

130

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

131

428 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1993).

132

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

2.
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Motion to Suppress

Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Preece1 3 that "[w]hen ruling upon a
motion to suppress a statement made by a suspect pursuant to a traffic investigation
due to the investigating officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings, the trial
court must determine whether the statement was the result of custodial
interrogation."' 14 The opinion noted that "Miranda warnings are required
whenever a suspect has been formally arrested or subjected to custodial
interrogation, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense." 13 5 Preece
concluded:
The sole issue before a trial court in determining whether a traffic
investigation has escalated into an accusatory, custodial
environment, requiring Miranda warnings, is whether a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would have considered his or her
freedom
of action curtailed to a degree associated with a formal
136
arrest.
H.

Trial Security

In State v. Peacher,137 Justice McHugh examined the use of security
measures by trial courts. The court held:
Although the use of security precautions at a criminal trial is a
matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, an
evidentiary hearing should be held to determine whether the
circumstances of a case justify greater than normal security
precautions at trial. The absence of a138record of such evidentiary
hearing is not, per se, reversible error.
L

Witness Immunity

The issue presented to Justice McHugh in State v. Pennington1 39 concerned
who may invoke immunity granted to a prosecution witness. The court held:

133

383 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1989).

134

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

135
136

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

137

280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981).

138

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

139

365 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1987).
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A prosecution witness who has purportedly been afforded
immunity from prosecution pursuant to W.Va. Code, 57-5-2
[1931], and who testifies against a defendant in a criminal
proceeding is the only person who may assert the protection of
that statute in regard to that grant of immunity. The defendant,
however, in that criminal proceeding may not assert irregularities
in regard to the granting of that immunity from prosecution.14 °
J.

Jury Instructions
In State v. Payne,141 the court stated:
Where the State's case is based upon the uncorroborated and
uncontradicted identification testimony of a prosecuting witness, it
is error not to instruct the jury upon request that, if they believe
from the evidence in the case that the crime charged against the
defendant rests alone on the testimony of the prosecuting witness,
then the jury should scrutinize such testimony with care and
caution.142

Justice McHugh quoted in part from the decision in Wiseman v. Ryan1 to
hold in State v. Harshbarger44 that
W. Va. R. Crim. P. 30 (1981) provides that "[u]niess otherwise
ordered by the court with the consent of all parties affected
thereby, instructions shall not be shown to the jury or taken to the
jury room." However, prior to the effective date of such rule on
October 1, 1981 "[i]t [was] in the trial court's sound discretion
whether instructions which have been read to the jury may be
taken by 14
them
to their room when they retire to consider... their
5
verdict."
Justice McHugh held in State v. Hall146 that "[a]n instruction to the jury is

proper if it is a correct statement of the law and if sufficient evidence has been

140

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

141

280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981).

142

Id.at Syl. Pt 5.

143

182 S.E. 670 (W. Va. 1935).

144

294 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 1982).

145

Id.at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).

146

298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).
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offered at trial to support it." 147
In State v. Kopa,148 Justice McHugh altered state precedent regarding the
giving of an instruction on the alibi defense. The court stated:
Because of the holding in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 119, 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982),
State v. Alexander, 161 W.Va. 776, 245 S.E.2d 633 (1978), is
overruled to the extent that it permits the giving of an instruction
that places the burden upon the defendant to prove his alibi
defense sufficiently1 49to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
jury as to his guilt.
Justice McHugh found it necessary to limit the scope of Kopa. The court
stated:
The invalidation of the instruction approved in State v. Alexander,
161 W.Va. 776, 245 S.E.2d 633 (1978), that places the burden
upon the defendant to prove his alibi defense sufficiently to create
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to his guilt[,] is only
applicable to those cases currently in litigation
or on appeal where
50
the error has been properly preserved at trial.1
The case of State v. Jones15 ' required Justice McHugh to develop a judicial
test for determining whether an instruction on a lesser included offense is
warranted. Justice McHugh held:
The question of whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction
on a lesser included offense involves a two-part inquiry. The first
inquiry is a legal one having to do with whether the lesser offense
is by virtue of its legal elements or defmition included in the
greater offense. The second inquiry is a factual one which
involves a determination by the trial court of whether there is
evidence 52 which would tend to prove such lesser included
offense.'
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Harper 53 that "[a] trial court must give
147

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

148

311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).

149

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

150

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

151

329 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1985).

152

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

153

365 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va. 1987).
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an instruction for a lesser included offense when evidence has been produced to
support such a verdict.

"'

Additionally, Justice McHugh stated in State v. Miller 55 that "[t]he trial
court must instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offenses charged, and
the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the essential elements deprives
of his fundamental right to a fair trial, and constitutes reversible
the accused
1 56
error."

K.

Jury Selection
Justice McHugh wrote in State v. Peacher5 7 that
[t]he right to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal
case is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14, of the West Virginia Constitution. A meaningful and
of the jury panel is necessary to effectuate that
effective voir dire 58
fundamental right.
The court in Peacherconcluded:
It is an abuse of discretion and reversible error for a trial judge, in
the exercise of his discretionary control over the scope of inquiry
during voir dire, to so limit the questioning of potential jurors as
to infringe upon a litigant's ability to determine whether the jurors
are free from interest, bias or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the
exercise of peremptory challenges. 15 9
Justice McHugh held in State v. Audia' 60 that
[w]here a prospective juror is one of a class of persons represented
by the prosecuting attorney at the time of trial, but there has been
no actual contact between that juror and the prosecutor, the
existence of the attorney-client relationship alone is not prima

14

Id.at Syl. Pt. 3.

155

400 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1990).

156

Id. at Syl.

157
158

280 S.E.2d 559 (W.Va. 1981).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

159

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

160

301 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1983).
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facie grounds for disqualification of that juror.161
Justice McHugh held in State v. Meadows 6 2 that "[w]here a prospective
juror, upon individual questioning, indicated that he was a former penitentiary
guard but had retired ten years before trial, it was not reversible error to permit him
to be ajuror where no prejudice was shown."'3
In State v. McFarland,164 Justice McHugh wrote that "[i]t is within the
sound discretion of the trial court to reject the proposed voir dire questions of a
criminal defendant when the questions are substantially covered by others which
are used."'5 The opinion also went on to hold:
A criminal defendant is not entitled as a matter of right, under syl.
pt. 7, State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), to
question potential jurors on voir dire to determine their views on
the various theories underlying incarceration, namely,
rehabilitation, punishment and deterrence. It is within the
discretion of the trial court whether such a question may be asked
on voir dire to enable the defendant to exercise more informed
judgment in utilizing his peremptory challenges.166
Justice McHugh made clear in State v. Finley167 that
[w]hen a trial court determines that prospective jurors have been
exposed to information which may be prejudicial, the trial court,
upon its own motion or motion of counsel, shall question or
permit the questioning of the prospective jurors individually, out
of the presence of the other prospective jurors, to ascertain
1
whether the prospective jurors remain free of bias or prejudice.
Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Dietz16 9 that
[i]n a criminal case the trial court's conduct of the voir dire is not
reversible error if it is conducted in a manner which safeguards the
161

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

162

304 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1983).

163

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

164

332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985).

165

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

166

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

167

355 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1987).

168

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

169

390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
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right of a defendant to be tried by a jury free of bias and prejudice.
Accordingly, it is not reversible error in a criminal case for a trial
court to refuse to ask questions submitted for voir dire by the
defendant if such questions are substantially covered by other
questions asked by the trial court.l70
L.

Plea Bargaining

In State ex rel. Forbes v. Kaufman,171 Justice McHugh addressed several
issues involving a trial court's sentencing discretion when a plea agreement is
entered. Justice McHugh stated:
Where the state agrees to make a sentencing recommendation and
enters into a plea agreement with the defendant pursuant to Rule
1l(e)(1)(B) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
trial court is not bound to impose the sentence recommended by
the state if it accepts the plea agreement.' 72
Justice McHugh indicated that
[w]here the state agrees that a specific sentence is a suitable
disposition of a criminal case and enters into a plea agreement
with the defendant pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may either
accept or reject the entire agreement, but it may not accept the
guilty plea and impose a different sentence. 73
Justice McHugh concluded in Forbes that
[i]f a plea is taken pursuant to a plea agreement and the state has
agreed to a specific sentence in that agreement, yet if it is not clear
whether the plea was taken under Rule 11(e)(1)(B) or 11(e)(1)(C)
of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge
may sentence the defendant without being bound by the
sentencing provision in the plea agreement.
Justice McHugh ruled in State ex rel.Phillips v. Boggess 7 s that
170

I&at syl. Pt. 10

171

404 S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

172

173

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

174

I at Syl. PL 3.

175

416 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1992).
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[a] request for a transcript by a criminal defendant is not
tantamount to an appeal. Therefore, an indigent defendant is
entitled to a transcript of his trial without endangering a prior plea
agreement wherein he agrees not to seek an appeal in exchange for
the agreement of the State to forego initiation of a recidivist
proceeding. If the defendant subsequently files a timely appeal,
the State should not be held to the plea agreement. 176
M.

Three Term Rule

The decision in State v. Young'77 restated a principle of law set out in State
ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry.178 In Young, Justice McHugh held:
The three regular terms of a court essential to the right of a
defendant to be discharged from further prosecution pursuant to
provisions of [W. Va.] Code, 62-3-21, as amended, are regular
terms occurring subsequent to the ending of the term at which the
indictment against him is found. The term at which the indictment
is returned179is not to be counted in favor of the discharge of a
defendant.
The three term rule was again addressed by Justice McHugh in State ex rel.
Webb v. Wilson.180 He held that
W.Va. Code, 62-3-21 [1959] limits the state to three unexcused
regular terms of court, calculated in accordance with State ex rel.
Spadafore v. Fox, 155 W.Va. 674, 186 S.E.2d 833 (1972), in
which to bring an accused to trial on the charges contained in an
indictment. Once three unexcused regular terms of court have
lapsed, and the state has failed to bring the accused to trial on the
charges contained in the indictment, the state may not further
proceed on the charges contained in the indictment, for, under the
plain meaning of the statute, the accused must be "forever
18 1
discharged" and the indictment dismissed.
Webb concluded that "[ounce an accused is indicted, an entire panoply of
constitutional rights attaches, including the right to trial without unreasonable

176

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

177

280 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1981).
120 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1961).

178

180

280 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 2.
390 S.E.2d 9 (W. Va. 1990).

181

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

179
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delay, as implemented by W.Va. Code, 62-3-21 [1959], regardless of whether
182 the
indictment is dismissed as void after three unexcused regular terms of court.,
N.

180 Day Rule

The requirement of prosecution within 180 days under the Agreement on
Detainers Act was addressed in State ex rel. Modie v. Hill.'8 Justice McHugh
wrote that
[t]he failure of the State to bring the accused to trial within 180
days following the State's receipt of the petitioner's notice of
imprisonment and request for final disposition of the case,
pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, W.Va. Code, 62-14-1,
article 11(a) and article V(c) [1971]; mandates the dismissal of the
indictments pending against the petitioner, where there was no
motion for continuance made by the State and the delay was not
reasonable or necessary.'84
0.

Venue

The case of State v. Peacher'8 addressed the issue of a defendant's ability
to change venue due to hostile sentiment. Justice McHugh wrote that "[a] change
of venue will be granted in West Virginia when it is shown that there is a present
hostile sentiment against an accused, extending throughout the entire county in
which he is brought to trial.' 186 Peacher also held that "[i]n a criminal case the
defendant who is trying to show the existence of a present hostile sentiment in the
community that would affect his right to187a fair and impartial jury panel should have
a wide latitude of inquiry on voir dire."'
In State v. McFarland,188 Justice McHugh stated:
Even though a majority of individuals surveyed in a county where
a prosecution is pending, by way of a questionnaire, indicate that,
based upon what they have heard or read, there is existing hostile
sentiment in that county but that the defendant would receive a
fair trial in that county, before a change of venue shall be granted
the circuit court must be satisfied that there exists in the county
182

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

183

443 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1994).

184

Id. at Syl.

185

280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981).

186

Id. at Syl. Pt 1.

187

Id. at Syl. PL 2.

188

332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985).
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where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against
the
89
defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.
P.

ProsecutorialMisconduct

In State v. Pennington,'90 Justice McHugh had to determine whether
pretrial statements by a prosecutor required the prosecutor be disqualified from the
case. He stated that
[w]here a prosecutor, while involved in his election campaign,
made pretrial statements regarding the status of a criminal case
and also by newspaper advertisements responded to his
opponent's newspaper advertisements which questioned acts of
the prosecutor in the conduct of that case, absent evidence that the
defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's conduct, that
conduct alone may not necessarily disqualify the prosecutor in
that case.1 9'
Justice McHugh held in State v. Haught'92 that
[e]ven though the prosecuting attorney participated in the
investigation surrounding the defendant's arrest and was present at
the defendant's arrest, where the record failed to disclose any
evidence which would indicate that the prosecutor's interest in
prosecuting the case went beyond his or her ordinary dedication to
his or her duty to see that justice is done, the trial court did not err
93
in denying a defendant's motion for a special prosecutor.
Q.

Appointment of Special Prosecutor
194
Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Kerns:

Where a special prosecutor is appointed to try a criminal case due
to a conflict, and the case is dismissed without prejudice, but the
defendant is reindicted on the same charges, it is not error for a
trial court to deny a motion to remove the special prosecutor if it
is shown that the conflict which led to the original removal of the

189

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

190

365 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1987).

191

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).

192
193

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

194

420 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1992).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss5/7

14

Davis and Palmer: Criminal Procedure

Special]

A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

regular prosecutor still exists. 95
In Harmanv. Frye,196 Justice McHugh held:
Criminal cases involving the issuance of cross-warrants must be
prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney, who is charged with the
duty under W.Va. Code, 7-4-1 [1971] of instituting and
prosecuting all necessary and proper criminal proceedings against
offenders, and, in cases where it would be improper for the
prosecuting attorney or his assistants to act, by a competent
attorney who is appointed to act under W.Va. Code, 7-7-8
[1987].

R.

97

Right to Counselfor Indigents

Justice McHugh took the opportunity in State ex rel. Barber v. Cline198 to
examine the procedures for appointing counsel to indigent defendants. The Barber
opinion stated:
Circuit courts ordinarily must follow the attorney-appointment
sequence set forth in W.Va. Code, .29-21-9(c) [1989].
Cunningham v. Sommerville, 182 W.Va. 427, 429, 388 S.E.2d
301, 303 (1989). The attorney-appointment sequence in circuits
where no public defender office is in operation is ordinarily as
follows: (1) a voluntary member of the local panel of attorneys;
(2) a voluntary member of the regional panel of attorneys; (3) any
public defender office in an adjoining circuit which agrees to the
appointment; (4) qualified private attorneys from in-circuit or
out-of-circuit. 199
Barbernext held that
[a] "local panel" under W.Va. Code, 29-21-9 [1989] is a panel of
private attorneys whose principal offices are located within the
circuit of the court establishing and maintaining such panel. A
"regional panel" under W.Va. Code, 29-21-9 [1989] is a panel of
private attorneys whose principal offices are located in circuits
adjoining the circuit of the court establishing and maintaining
195

Id. at Syl. PL 8.

196

425 S.E.2d 566 (W. Va. 1992).

197

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

198

391 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1990).

199

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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such panel.200
Justice McHugh also stated:
Reading W.Va.

Code, 29-21-5(a) [1989] and W.Va.

Code,

29-21-9(a)-(b) [1989] in pari materia, we hold that the executive
director of public defender services has the obligation to assist
each circuit court in establishing and maintaining local and
regional panels of private attorneys desirous of appointments. In
addition, such director has the obligation of assisting circuit courts
by developing and revising periodically a statewide list of other
"qualified private attorneys" from in-circuit or out-of-circuit who
may be appointed to represent indigents in eligible proceedings
when no local or regional panel attorney or public 20defender
or
1
assistant public defender is available for appointment.
The opinion in Barberconcluded that "[an] out-of-circuit lawyer in private
practice who has never practiced law in a certain circuit and whose partners and
associates, if any, have never practiced law in that circuit ordinarily should
not be
20 2
appointed to represent indigents in eligible proceedings in such circuit.
Justice McHugh clarified the procedure for paying attorney fees to counsel
appointed to represent indigents in the case of Judy v. White. 203 It was said initially
that
W.Va. Code, 29-21-13a [1990] mandates that a trial court review
vouchers submitted by court-appointed attorneys for indigent
criminal defendants to determine if the time and expense claims
made therein are reasonable, necessary and valid; and said trial
court shall then forward the voucher to the agency with an order
approving payment of the claimed amount or such lesser sum as
the trial court considers appropriate. The decision of the trial court
in that regard will not be altered by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals absent an abuse of discretion.2 4
The court in Judy held:
Trial courts must give a brief explanation for any order reducing
the amount of fees claimed by a court-appointed attorney by virtue
of W.Va. Code, 29-21-13a [1990]. Said explanation must provide
200

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

201

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

202

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

203

425 S.E.2d 588 (w. Va. 1992).

204

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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enough guidance for the court-appointed attorney to respond
meaningfully by petitioning the trial court for reconsideration of
the reduction order and allowing the attorney to submit additional
supporting written documentation and explanation without
appearance. The trial court shall then set the final amount of
compensation without further explanation. Absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's decision is final.205
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of right to counsel in municipal
criminal court in the case of State ex reL Kees v. Sanders.20 6 The court held:
In a municipal court proceeding on a minor traffic offense, where
a judge states, in advance of the proceeding, that notwithstanding
the applicable provision which permits a jail sentence, the judge
will under no condition impose one nor impose a fine so onerous
that the defendant cannot pay it thereby subjecting him to a
contempt charge which may result in a jail sentence, then
appointment of counsel pursuant to W.Va. Code, 29-21-2(2)
[1990] is not required. 0 7
S.

Discovery

In State v. Audia,20 8 Justice McHugh ruled that "[s]ubject to certain
exceptions, pretrial
discovery in a criminal case is within the sound discretion of
20 9
the trial court.
The opinion in State v. Tame 1 addressed the issue of a defendant's
ability to discover the identity of an informant from the prosecutor. Justice
McHugh wrote:
When the State in a criminal action refuses to disclose to the
defendant the identity of an informant, the trial court upon motion
shall conduct an in camera inspection of written statements
submitted by the State as to why discovery by the defendant of the
identity of the informant should be restricted or not permitted. A
record shall be made of both the in court proceedings and the
statements inspected in camera upon the disclosure issue. Upon
the entry of an order granting to the State nondisclosure to the
205

laat Syl. Pt. 3.

206

453 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1994).

207

Id.at Syl. Pt 1.

208

301 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1983).

209

Id.at Syl. Pt.8.

210

290 S.E.2d 14 (W. Va. 1982).
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defendant of the identity of the informant, the entire record of the
in camera inspection shall be sealed, preserved in the records of
the court, and made available to this Court in the event of an
appeal. In ruling upon the issue of disclosure of the identity of an
informant, the trial court shall balance the need of the State for
nondisclosure in the promotion of law enforcement with the
consequences of nondisclosure upon the defendant's ability to
receive a fair trial. The resolution of the disclosure issue shall rest
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and only an abuse of
discretion will result in reversal.21 '
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of production of statements by a
2 12 The court held:
testifying witness in State v. McFarland.
After a witness other than the defendant has testified on direct
examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call the
witness, shall order the attorney for the state or the defendant and
his attorney, as the case may be, to produce for the examination
and use of the moving party any statement of the witness that is in
their possession that relates to the subject matter concerning
which the witness had testified.213
He further held in McFarlandthat "[a] witness' notes which are abstracts
from reports in the possession of a defendant in a criminal
case do not constitute a
'statement' as defined in W. Va. R. Crim. P. 26.2(f). ' ' 214
In State v. Bennett,215 Justice McHugh addressed late disclosure of
discoverable matters by the state in a murder prosecution. The court held:
Where a defendant charged with murder of the first degree filed
discovery motions seeking information concerning the manner in
which the homicide was committed and a list of persons
possessing knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
homicide, and the motions were granted by the trial court, the
defendant was entitled to a new trial where (1) the State, two days
before trial, informed defense counsel of the existence of a
weapon used in the commission of the homicide, which weapon
the State had knowledge of in excess of two months before trial,
(2) the State, during the trial, revealed to defense counsel the
names of four witnesses who could connect the weapon to both
211

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

212

332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985).

213

Id. at Syl. Pt. 13.

214

Id. at Syl. Pt. 14.

215

339 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1985).
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the homicide and the defendant and (3) in camera hearings
conducted during the trial with regard to such previously
undisclosed evidence failed to overcome the undue prejudice
suffered by the defendant at trial because of the non-disclosure.216
T.

Extradition

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of a defendant's ability to challenge
being extradited to West Virginia for prosecution in the case of State v. Flint.217
The court held that "[o]nce a fugitive has been brought within the jurisdiction of
West Virginia as the demanding state, the propriety of the extradition proceedings
which occurred in the asylum state may not be challenged.
The extradition
218
proceedings may be challenged only in the asylum state.,
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving a rendition warrant in
Cronauerv. State.219 The court held that
[a] rendition warrant issued by the Governor of this State under
W.Va. Code, 5-1-8(a) [1937], in response to a request for
extradition from the executive authority of a demanding state
pursuant to 'the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, as amended,
W.Va. Code, 5-1-7 to 5-1-13, "substantially recite[s] the facts
necessary to the validity of its issuance" with respect to the crime
charged therein, as required by W.Va. Code, 5-1-8(a) [1937], if the
rendition warrant contains a statement that gives the person sought
to be extradited reasonable notice of the nature of the crime
charged in the demanding state; and a circuit court, when
determining the sufficiency of a rendition warrant in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging the validity of custody in
connection with extradition proceedings, may examine underlying
documents filed by the demanding state in support of its request
for extradition. z 0
Justice McHugh held in Feathersv. Detricle'that
[u]nder the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (W.Va. Code, 5-1-7
through W.Va. Code, 5-1-13), a demand for the extradition of one
who has been convicted of a crime and sentenced and who,
216

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

217

301 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1983).

218

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

219

322 S.E.2d 862 (W. Va. 1984).

220

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

221

336 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1985).
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thereafter, is alleged to have broken the terms of his or her parole,
must be supported by documents authenticated by the executive
authority of the demanding state, including a copy of a judgment
of conviction or a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together
with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state
that the person demanded has broken the terms of his or her
parole. 22 2
The court in Feathersalso ruled:
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (W.Va. Code, 5-1-7
through W.Va. Code, 5-1-13), does not require, as a prerequisite to

the extradition of an alleged parole violator, a judicial
determination by the demanding state of probable cause to believe
that the person demanded has broken the terms of his or her
parole. 2 3
U.

Investigative Servicesfor Indigents

In State v. Less,22 4 Justice McHugh wrote that "[i]t is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial judge whether investigative services are necessary
under W.Va. Code, 51-11-18, and the exercise of such discretion will not constitute
reversible error unless the trial judge abuses such discretion. "225
V.

Same Judge PresidingOver Different CasesAgainst Defendant

Justice McHugh made it clear in State v. Flint226 that "[it is not error for a
trial judge to preside over more than one criminal case involving the same
defendant even though some of the facts are the same in each of the cases. ,27
W.

Stay and Postponement

Justice McHugh outlined the difference between staying a proceeding and
postponing execution of a sentence in the case of State ex rel. Dye v.
Bordenkircher.22 8 The court held:

222

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

223

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

224

294 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 1981).

225

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

226

301 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1983).

227

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

228

284 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 1981).
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The term "postponing the execution of the sentence" in W.Va.
Code, 62-7-1 [1931], is not synonymous with the term "stay of
proceedings" in W.Va. Code, 62-7-2 [1931]. A postponement of
the execution of the sentence in a criminal case under W.Va.
Code, 62-7-1 [1931], delays that one specific event in the case. A
stay of proceedings under W.Va. Code, 62-7-2 [1931], however,
stops all action in the circuit court which otherwise might occur in
a case after the stay takes effect22 9
X.

Competency of Defendant

Justice McHugh addressed issues concerning the holding of a competency
hearing for a defendant in State v. Church.23 The court held initially that
[a] trial judge's failure to make a finding on the issue of a criminal
defendant's competency to stand trial within five days after the
filing of a report by one or more psychiatrists or a psychiatrist and
a psychologist in compliance with W.Va. Code, 27-6A-1(d)
[1977], will not be considered to be reversible error requiring a
new trial
absent prejudice to the defendant resulting from such
231
failure.
The court in Church concluded:
Even though a trial judge does not make a finding on the issue of a
criminal defendant's competency to stand trial within five days
after the filing of a report by one or more psychiatrists or a
psychiatrist and a psychologist, the defendant may request a
hearing on that issue under W.Va. Code, 27-6A-l(d) [1977], at any
reasonable time prior to trial.232
Justice McHugh relied on State v. Dagget? in State v. Wimer 234 to hold:
There exists in the trial of an accused a presumption of sanity.
However, should the accused offer evidence that he was insane,
the presumption of sanity disappears and the burden is on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
9

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

230

284 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1981).

231
232

Ia at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

233

280 S.E.2d 545 (W. Va. 1981).

2M

284 S.E.2d 890 (W. Va. 1981).
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was sane at the time of the offense. 3 5
Justice McHugh found in State v. Swiger 236 that
[a] circuit court committed reversible error in finding a criminal
defendant mentally competent to stand trial, where the sole
witnesses who testified at the hearing to determine the defendant's
competency were a psychologist and a psychiatrist, and the record
clearly revealed that, (1) the testimony of the psychologist that the
defendant was competent to stand trial was equivocal and subject
to a previous indication by that psychologist that a psychiatric
evaluation should be conducted to "support or deny" the
psychologist's opinion concerning the defendant's competency,
and (2) the psychiatrist, who examined the defendant upon two
occasions, consistently maintained that the defendant was
incompetent to stand trial.237
The court in Swiger also held:
Where a defendant in a felony case, found by a court of record to
be incompetent to stand trial, is civilly committed to a mental
health facility pursuant to W.Va. Code, 27-6A-2(d) [1979], and
W.Va. Code, 27-5-1 et seq. [1979], "the defendant's competency
to stand trial shall, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 27-6A-2(d) [1979],
23 8
thereafter be periodically reviewed."
In State v. Bias, 239 Justice McHugh was asked to determine the status of
criminal charges against a defendant found incompetent to stand trial. The court
held:
Being a bar to trial, an accused's incompetency to stand trial,
regardless of the duration thereof, will not, as a matter of due
process, ordinarily require dismissal of an indictment for a felony.
The State must, however, show that the accused suffered no
substantial prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary
and inevitable delay attendant to the attainment of competency to

235

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

236

336 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1985).

237

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

238

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

239

352 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1986).
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Bias also held that "[a]ny term during which the defendant is unable to be
tried because his or her competency to stand trial is being tested or evaluated does
not count in favor of discharge from prosecution under the three-term rule, W.Va.
Code, 62-3-21 [1959]. " 241

Justice McHugh addressed the competency of a defendant once again in
the case of State v. Hafield.242 The court observed initially that "[i]t is a

fundamental guaranty of due process that a defendant cannot be tried or convicted
for a crime while he or she is mentally incompetent. '" 243 Justice McHugh then ruled
that
iw]here a circuit court has found that a defendant in a criminal
case where the possible punishment is life imprisonment without
mercy is competent to stand trial, but subsequent to the
competency hearing, the defendant attempts to commit suicide,
then against advice of counsel indicates his desire to plead guilty
to the charges in the indictment, before taking the plea of guilty,
the trial judge should make certain inquiries of the defendant and
counsel for the defendant in addition to those mandated in Call v.
McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 220 S.E.2d 665 (1975). The court
should require counsel to state on the record the reason why
counsel opposes the guilty plea. The court should then ask the
defendant to acknowledge on the record that he understands his
counsel's statements and if in view of them he still desires to
plead guilty. If the defendant then states
he still desires to plead
244
guilty, the court may accept the plea.
Y.

Revocation of Bail

Justice McHugh outlined procedures for holding a hearing to determine
reinstatement of revoked bail in the case of Marshallv. Casey.2" The court held:
An accused admitted to bail pursuant to W.Va. Code, 62-1C-1
[1983], et seq., whose bail is subsequently revoked, upon credible
evidence reflected in a sworn affidavit by the prosecuting
attorney, a law enforcement officer, surety or other appropriate
240

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

241

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

242

413 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1991).

243

1& at Syl. Pt. 5.

244

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

245

324 S.E.2d 346 (W. Va. 1984).
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person, for alleged violations of law or conditions of the bail, may,
by motion, challenge the revocation of bail and seek readmission
to bail and upon that motion, the accused shall be entitled to a
hearing. The hearing concerning the revocation of bail and
requested readmission to bail shall be governed by subdivision (h)
of Rule 46 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which subdivision provides for "Bail Determination Hearings" in
certain bail matters.246
Z.

ProbationHearing

In State v. Turley,247 Justice McHugh stated that "[p]robation statutes are
remedial in nature and are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant." 248
Justice McHugh addressed several probation issues in State v. Godfrey.249
The opinion held initially that
[a] trial judge should, ordinarily, hear testimony regarding
whether a defendant should be placed on probation if that
defendant is statutorily eligible for such probation. The extent of
such testimony, however, is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. 5 0
Godfrey next held that "[v]iolation of the procedural requirement of W. Va.
Code, 62-12-8 [1939], that-an order denying probation state the reasons for such
denial, will not be grounds for remand for resentencing where the reasons appear in
the sentencing record., 251 Justice McHugh concluded in Godfrey:
W.Va. Code, 62-12-2 [1979], which provides, in part, that, "[a]ll
persons who have not been previously convicted of a felony
within five years from the date of the felony for which they are
charged ...

shall be eligible for probation" does not preclude a

trial judge from considering a prior conviction when deciding
whether to grant probation.252

246

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

247

350 S.E.2d 696 (W. Va. 1986).

248

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

249

289 S.E.2d 660 (W. Va. 1981).

250

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

251

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3

252

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).
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Justice McHugh wrote in State v. Ranski that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 62-12-2(c) [1979], a trial judge must
specifically find, as a matter of record, that a firearm was used in
the commission of the crime before a person convicted of the
crime upon a plea of guilty may be found to 54be ineligible for
probation under W.Va. Code, 62-12-2(b) [1979].2
Justice McHugh noted in State v. Kerns55 that "[a]llowance and recovery
of costs was unknown at common law, and therefore only costs specifically
allowed by statute may be recovered. '' 25 6 The court concluded that "W.Va. Code,
62-12-9 [1992] does not authorize a circuit court to impose, as a condition of
probation, that a convicted criminal defendant pay the fees of a special prosecutor
as costs of the prosecution."5 AA.

Good Time Credit
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Goff v. Merifield2 s8 that
[a] person who is ordered to serve a consecutive six-month period
in the county jail as a condition of probation for one offense and
also sentenced to serve an additional six-month period in the
county jail on another offense, with the two six-month periods to
be served consecutively, is eligible for good time credit pursuant
to W.Va. Code, 7-8-11 [1986.2 59

Goff concluded that "[w]hen a person is ordered to confinement in the
county jail as a condition of probation and performs work as a trustee within the
jail, that person is entitled to a reduction in his sentence for work performed in the
county jail according to W.Va. Code, 17-15-4 [1987]. "25o

253

289 S.E.2d 756 (W. Va. 1982).

254

I.kat Syl.

255

420 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1992).

256

1d at Syl. Pt. 2.

257

Id.at Syl. Pt. 3.

258

446 S.E.2d 695 (W. Va. 1994).

2

Id.
L59
at Syl. Pt. 6.
Idlat Syl.Pt. 11.

260
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Search with Warrant

In State v. Peacher,261 the court was concerned with the validity of a search
warrant that was issued based upon an affidavit that contained information from an
unlawful search. Justice McHugh wrote:
An affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant
which contains information that antedates, and is totally
independent of, information learned from an unconstitutional
search, as well as information from the unconstitutional search,
may still be the basis upon which a valid search warrant may
issue, if the information in the affidavit, excluding that
information attributable to the unconstitutional search, is sufficient
to justify a finding of probable cause.26
In State v. Hall,263 Justice McHugh held that "[t]he property to be seized
must be described within the warrant itself or within the sworn complaint expressly
made a part of the warrant by
direct reference thereto. A search warrant should not
'2
be made a catchall dragnet. 6
Justice McHugh addressed the authority of conservation officers to execute
a search warrant in State v. Boggess.26 The court held:
Following a valid arrest by a conservation officer, employed by
the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, for the
offense of possession of marihuana with the intent to deliver, the
conservation officer was authorized under the provisions of W.Va.
Code, 20-7-4 [1971], which statute describes the authority, powers
and duties of conservation officers, and W.Va. Code, 62-1A-3
[1965], which statute concerns search and seizure, to execute a
valid search warrant relating to the arrested individual's
automobile, which automobile was found at the scene of the
offense.266
Justice McHugh held in State v. Haugh?67 that "[t]he description
contained in a search warrant is sufficient where a law enforcement officer charged
with making a search may, by the description of the premises contained in the
261

280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981).

262

Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.

263

298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).

264

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

265

309 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1983).

266

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

267

371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).
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search warrant, identify
' 26 and ascertain the place intended to be searched with
reasonable certainty. 1
CC.

Search Without Warrant

The decision in State v. Cecil2r9 addressed search.and seizure without a
warrant. Justice McHugh held:
Although a search and seizure by police officers must ordinarily
be predicated upon a written search warrant, a warrantless entry
by police officers of a mobile home was proper under the
"emergency doctrine" exception to the warrant requirement,
where the record indicated that, rather than being motivated by an
intent to make an arrest or secure evidence, the police officers
were attempting to locate an injured or deceased child, which
child the officers had reason to believe was in the mobile home,
because
of information they received immediately prior to the
270
entry.
The issue of a warrantless search and seizure was again addressed by
Justice McHugh in the case of State v. Tadder.271 That court held:
Where police officers apprehended in a building two suspects of a
breaking and entering of that building, and minutes thereafter the
officers stopped a truck with two occupants attempting to leave
the scene of the breaking and entering, a warrantless search of the
vehicle by the officers, which resulted in the seizure from the
glove compartment of the wallets of the suspects apprehended in
the building, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, where the record
demonstrated that the defendant, as a passenger in the truck, had
no property or possessory interest in the truck, its glove
compartment, or the items seized and, therefore, suffered no
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy. 2

268

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

269

311 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1983).

270

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

271

313 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1984).

272

Idl at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Issuance of Warrant

Justice McHugh held in Matter of Monroe273 that
[t]he determination of whether probable cause exists to support
the issuance of an arrest warrant under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 4 is
solely a judicial function to be performed by the magistrate and is
or from an
to be based upon the contents of "the complaint,
274
affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint.,
EE.

PromptPresentment

In State v. Mitter,275 Justice McHugh relied upon the decision in State v.
Persinger276 to examine the delay by police officers in taking a defendant before a
judicial officer for an initial appearance. Mitter held that "[t]he delay in taking the
defendant to a magistrate may be a critical factor where it appears that the primary
purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the defendant. ' 277
FF.

Recording Proceedings
Relying on State v. Bolling,278 Justice McHugh held in State v. Nea 27 9 that

"[u]nder the provisions of W.Va. Code, 51-7-1 and -2, all proceedings in the
criminal trial are required to be reported; however, the failure ' to
280 report all of the
proceedings may not in all instances constitute reversible error.
GG.

PrisonTransfer

The case of Matter of Crews?81 required Justice McHugh to address the
ability of inmates to transfer from prison to a state hospital for mental health and
drug treatment. The court held as follows:
Inasmuch as the 1980 amendment to W.Va. Code, 28-5-31,
modified the procedure for transfer of a "convicted person" in
273

327 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1985).

274

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

275

289 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1982).

276

286 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1982).

277

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

278

246 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1978).

279

304 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).

280

Id. at Syl.

281

283 S.E.2d 925 (W. Va. 1981).
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prison under that statute, and further added provisions concerning
security at the facility to which transfer is sought, but did not
substantially change the criteria for transfer under the statute or
the due process rights of a convicted person in a prison, under the
circumstances of this case the "convicted persons" in prisons will
not be prejudiced by being required to proceed under W.Va. Code,
28-5-31, as 282
amended in 1980, if they wish to further prosecute
their claims.
HH.

Protective Custody

Justice McHugh examined the rights of inmates held in protective custody
in the case of Bishop v. McCoy.28 The court noted as a general matter that
[p]rotective custody inmates, as well as other prison inmates in the
West Virginia correctional system, have rights, as described in
Hackl v. Dale, 171 W.Va. 415, 299 S.E.2d 26 (1982), and Cooper
v. Gwinn, 171 W.Va. 245, 298 S.E.2d 781 (1981), to (1)
reasonable protection from constant threat of violence and sexual
assault by fellow inmates and (2) rehabilitation.2 4
Bishop then went on to hold in detail:
In securing the rights of protective custody inmates to reasonable
protection from constant threat of violence and sexual assault and
to rehabilitation, the Commissioner of the West Virginia
Department of Corrections is hereby directed to (1) establish and
maintain, in addition to the safeguarding of protective custody
inmates of the West Virginia Penitentiary at Moundsville,
protective custody facilities for the safeguarding, for such periods
of time as may be required, of protective custody inmates of
institutions other than the West Virginia Penitentiary at
Moundsville, and such facilities shall be in addition to the
Protective Custody Unit at the West Virginia Penitentiary at
Moundsville and shall be at a location or locations other than at
the penitentiary at Moundsville; (2) ensure that all protective
custody inmates, whether of the West Virginia Penitentiary at
Moundsville or otherwise, shall, in continuing their rehabilitation,
be entitled to the same educational, vocational, recreational and
other program opportunities to which other prison inmates in this
State are entitled and (3) ensure that no prison inmate under the
supervision of the West Virginia Department of Corrections who
282

Id. at Syl.

283

323 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1984).

24

Id at Syl. PL 3.
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is not a maximum security inmate is transferred, solely for the
purpose of placing that inmate in protective custody, to a
maximum security institution.2
I.

Multiple Prosecutions

In State v. Adkins,286 Justice McHugh was called upon to revisit a decision
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Dowdy v.
Robinson.287 In Dowdy, the court held that West Virginia Code section 61-11-14
was unconstitutional because it provided for multiple prosecutions of the same
defendant for the same offense after an acquittal.2 88 In Adkins, however, Justice
McHugh ruled that "[s]yllabus point 2 of State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 154
W.Va. 263, 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), was overbroad and is hereby overruled. ' 289
JJ.

Mistrial

Several issues concerned with a motion for mistrial made by the defendant
were addressed by Justice McHugh in State v. Pennington.290 Justice McHugh held
that "[w]hen a mistrial is granted on motion of the defendant, unless the defendant
was provoked into moving for the mistrial because of prosecutorial or judicial
conduct, a retrial may not be barred on the basis of jeopardy principles."1291 The
decision also held:
Where a defendant moves for a mistrial and fails to withdraw that
motion before the motion is granted by the trial court, the trial
court's declaration of the mistrial cannot be characterized as sua
sponte, when the record does not disclose an objection by the
defendant to the trial court's action. Thus, further prosecution of
the defendant under the above circumstances does not offend
jeopardy principles embodied in the federal and state
constitutions. 292
In Dietz v. Legursky,293 Justice McHugh held that
285

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

286

289 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1982).

287

257 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979).

288

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

289

Adkins, 289 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 2.

290

365 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1987).

291

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

292

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

293

425 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1992).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss5/7

30

Davis and Palmer: Criminal Procedure

A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E.McHUGH

Special]

[b]ecause the right of a defendant in a criminal case to testify on
his or her own behalf is fundamental, then, in a case where a trial
court represents that a mistrial will be declared if the defendant
does not so testify, in the event that the defendant does not in fact
testify and can demonstrate that he or she decided to not testify in
reliance on the trial court's representation, it is reversible error for
the trial court to not declare a mistrial. 94
KK.

Return of Seized Property

Justice McHugh stated in Ray v. Mangun2 95 that "[a]bsent express
statutory authority providing for the humane destruction of gamecocks seized as a
result of illegal cockfighting in violation of W.Va. Code, 61-8-19 [1931], such
'
gamecocks ordinarily must be returned to the owners thereof."296
LL.

Preservationof Evidence

Justice McHugh was called upon to give trial courts guidance in resolving
issues arising from the loss of evidence by prosecutors in the case of State v.
Osakalumi.297 The court held:
When the State had or should have had evidence requested by a
criminal defendant but the evidence no longer exists when the
defendant seeks its production, a trial court must determine (1)
whether the requested material, if in the possession of the State at
the time of the defendant's request for it, would have been subject
to disclosure under either West Virginia Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 or case law; (2) whether the State had a duty to
preserve the material; and (3) if the State did have a duty to
preserve the material, whether the duty was breached and what
consequences should flow from the breach. In determining what
consequences should flow from the State's breach of its duty to
preserve evidence, a trial court should consider (1) the degree of
negligence or bad faith involved; (2) the importance of the
missing evidence considering the probative value and reliability of
secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and (3)
the sufficiency of the other evidence produced at the trial to
sustain the conviction.2 98

294

Id at Syl. Pt. 1.

295

346 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1986).

296

Id at Syl.

297

461 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1995).

298

l at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Use of Exhibits by Jury During Deliberations
In State v. Armstrong,2 99 Justice McHugh held:
The jury, during deliberations, may use an exhibit, admitted into
evidence, according to its nature and within the bounds of the
evidence at trial in order to aid the jury in weighing the evidence,
and the jury may make a more critical examination of an exhibit
than was made during the trial.300
30 1
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Dietz:

In a criminal case it is not reversible error for a trial court to allow
a document, such as a transcript, a written statement, or a tape
recording, any of which contains a confession or incriminating
statement, and which has already been admitted into evidence, to
be taken into the jury room for the jury's use during
deliberations.° 2
NN.

Sentencing
In State v. Turley,30 3 Justice McHugh held that
[a] person who has attained his or her sixteenth birthday but has
not reached his or her twenty-first birthday at the time of the
commission of the crime and who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to aggravated robbery is eligible for suspension of sentence and
commitment to30 a youthful offender center under W.Va. Code,
25-4-6 [1975].

Justice McHugh held in State v. Finley305 that "[a] sentencing judge, in
evaluating a defendant's potential for rehabilitation and in determining the
defendant's sentence,
may consider the defendant's false testimony observed
30 6
during the trial.
299

369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988).

300
301

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).

302

Id.at Syl. Pt 11.

303

350 S.E.2d 696 (W. Va. 1986).

304

Id. at Syl. PL 4.

305

355 S.E.2d 47 (W.Va. 1987).

306

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Justice McHugh addressed sentencing a defendant pursuant to the habitual
offender statute in State v. Cain.307 That court held:
A person convicted of a felony may not be sentenced pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 61-11-18, -19 [1943], unless a recidivist information
and any or all material amendments thereto as to the person's
prior conviction or convictions are filed by the prosecuting
attorney with the court before expiration of the term at which such
person was convicted, so that such person is confronted with the
including any or all
facts charged in the entire 30information,
8
material amendments thereto.
Justice McHugh indicated in State v. Haugh 0 9 that
[b]efore a trial court conditions its recommendation for a
defendant's parole upon the defendant's payment of statutory
fines, costs and attorney's fees, the trial court must consider the
financial resources of the defendant, the defendant's ability to pay
and the nature of the burden that the payment of such costs will
impose upon the defendant. 310
In State v. Kerns,31' Justice McHugh held that "[a] circuit court has the
authority under W.Va. Code, 62-12-4 [1943] to apply the work release provisions of
W.Va. Code, 62-11A-1 [1988] in lieu of a sentence of ordinary confinement
imposed by a magistrate court in a misdemeanor case." 312 The court also stated
that "[a] circuit court has the authority under W.Va. Code, 62-12-4 [1943] to order
electronically monitored home confinement, in a county having the equipment
therefor,
in lieu of incarceration imposed by a magistrate court in a misdemeanor
313
case."

Justice McHugh stated in State v. Craf?14 that
[p]ursuant to W. Va. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D), if the comments of
the defendant and his counsel or testimony or other information
introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the

307

359 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1987).

308

Il at Syl. Pt. 1.

309

371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at Syl. PL 1.

310

312

394 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1990).
I at Syl. Pt. 2.

313

Id. at Syl. PL 4.

314

490 S.E.2d 315 (W. Va. 1997).
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presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or
part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make
(i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no
such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not
be taken into account in sentencing. A written record of such
findings and determinations shall be appended to and accompany
any copy of the presentence investigation report thereafter made
available to the West Virginia Board of Parole.315
00.

Executive Clemency

Some of the practical effects of a reprieve were addressed by Justice
McHugh in County Commission of Mercer County v. Dodrill.316 The court held

that
[w]hen the governor grants a reprieve to an individual held in a
county jail, who has been convicted of a felony and has been
lawfully sentenced to the custody of the State Department of
Corrections, but the reprieve is granted merely to delay that
individual's transfer to a state penal or correctional institution, the
state will be required to pay the reasonable maintenance and
medical expenses related to that individual which are incurred by
the county due to that delay.317
PP.

Magistrate Court Criminal Procedure

In State ex rel. Tate v. Bailey,318 Justice McHugh followed the lead of
Justice Miller in State ex rel. Burdette v. Scott319 to hold that "W. Va. Code, 50-5-7

(1976), requires that if a defendant is charged by warrant in the magistrate court
with an offense over which that
court has jurisdiction, he is entitled to a trial on the
' 320
merits in the magistrate court.
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. O'Neill v. Gay3 21 that "[p]ursuant to
the provisions of W.Va. Code, 50-5-13 [1976], a defendant who pleads guilty in
magistrate court to a criminal offense may appeal to circuit court, and to obtain
such an appeal, the defendant need not allege error committed by the magistrate

315

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

316

385 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1989).

317

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

318

274 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1981).

319

259 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1979).

320

Tate, 274 S.E.2d at Syl.

321

285 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1981).
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Court."

Justice McHugh addressed several issues affecting prosecution in
magistrate court in the case of Manning v. Inge.323 Manning held initially that
"[j]eopardy attaches in a non-jury trial in a magistrate court which is exercising
proper jurisdiction when the accused has been charged in a valid warrant and has
entered a plea and the magistrate has begun to hear evidence." 324 The court then
looked at the authority of a prosecuting attorney to seek disqualification of a
magistrate. Justice McHugh held:
The State is a party to a criminal proceeding for the purposes of
W.Va. Code, 50-4-7 [1978], and the prosecuting attorney may file
an affidavit alleging that a magistrate before whom the criminal
proceeding is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against the State or in favor of the defendant or that he has
counseled with the defendant respecting the merits of the
proceeding. 3
The Manning decision went on to state that
"[t]he discretionary decision to move for the disqualification of a
magistrate under W.Va. Code, 50-4-7 [1978], ultimately rests with
the prosecuting attorney as the State's official representative in a
criminal case. The exercise of that discretion must be properly
evidenced by the execution of an affidavit by the prosecuting
attorney."i326

Justice McHugh held in Matter of Mendez327 that "[a] magistrate328 in West
Virginia has no power to suspend a sentence imposed in a criminal case."
In Hannan v. Frye,32 Justice McHugh abolished the practice of allowing
individuals to go directly to magistrates to take out criminal complaints against
their neighbors. The court held:
Except where there is a specific statutory exception, a magistrate
may not issue a warrant or summons for a misdemeanor or felony

322

Id.at Syl.

323

288 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1982).
id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

324

325
326

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. PL 2.

327

344 S.E.2d 396 (W. Va. 1985).

328

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

329

425 S.E.2d 566 (W. Va. 1992).
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solely upon the complaint of a private citizen without a prior
evaluation of the citizen's complaint by the prosecuting attorney
or an investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Following such evaluation by the prosecuting attorney or
investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency, the
prosecuting attorney shall institute all necessary and proper
proceedings before the magistrate, and, in suitable cases, law
enforcement officers may obtain warrants and assist private
citizens in obtaining the warrant or summons from the magistrate.
To the extent In re Monroe, 174 W.Va. 401, 327 S.E.2d 163
(1985), is inconsistent with our holding in this case, it is
overruled."3
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Penal and Remedial Statutes

In State ex rel. Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v.
Sommerville,' 1 Justice McHugh was called upon to determine if the state statute
regulating the weight of trucks was remedial or criminal. The court held initially
that "[w]here a statute contains provisions which are both remedial and penal, such
statute should be considered remedial when seeking to enforce the purpose for
which it was enacted, and should be considered penal when seeking to enforce the
3 2
penalty provided therein.",
Justice McHugh then said:
W.Va. Code, 17C-17-10(a) [1976] authorizes a police officer or a
member of a Division of Highways' official weighing crew to
"require the driver of any vehicle or combination of vehicles on
any highway to stop and submit such vehicle or combination of
vehicles to a weighing[,]" even where the driver refuses to
comply pursuant to W.Va. Code, 17C-17-10(c) [1976] and is thus
subject to a criminal penalty.2
Justice McHugh stated in State ex rel. Palumbo v. Graley's Body Shop,
Inc.- 4 that
[t]he question of whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is
civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction, and requires
330
331

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
412 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1991).

332

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

333

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).
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425 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1992).
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